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A TRIAL JUDGE'S PERSPECTIVE -
PROMOTING JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS WHILE
PROTECTING PRIVILEGE*
Honorable Marian Blank Horn**
Let me start this evening by saying how happy I am to be here
with you tonight. I feel fortunate to have been chosen to follow in
the proud tradition of Maureen McNamara and to deliver this lec-
ture in her honor. I take my place behind Ms. McNamara and the
other distinguished women who have preceded me.
Unlike some of my predecessors, however, I am made even
more humble by having to walk up the front steps into this build-
ing, the same way I did on my first day of law school as a terrified
1L. All my old insecurities flooded back into my consciousness. In
the audience are a number of my law school classmates, and my
husband who graduated two years ahead of me, also from the law
school. I suspect not one of us would have guessed I would be
lucky enough to be a federal judge and to be standing here with
you tonight. I also want to acknowledge one of my daughters, who
is in the audience. Of all the jobs I have held, and the brochure
announcing tonight's program is far too flattering, the most impor-
tant and the most enjoyable job on my resume is that of mother to
my three accomplished daughters.
For the students in the audience, I have to tell you, based on
everything I have seen and heard - and I have visited the law
school from time to time in the intervening years - this is a far
more user-friendly place than it used to be. I believe the strength
of today's Fordham Law School is due in large part to the leader-
ship of your Dean, John Feerick. I am proud to call him a friend
* The following lecture was presented at the Fordham University School of Law
as the Annual Maureen E. McNamara Memorial Lecture on October 6, 1998. The
goal was to offer an audience of students, faculty and practitioners a judge's
perspective on litigation, and also to discuss from a somewhat more academic
perspective a related legal issue. As a speech, it was never intended as an exhaustive
legal treatise, but rather as a way to spark interest in the topics covered and to lay a
foundation to further the practice of law. Moreover, to promote the delivery of her
remarks, the lecturer did engage in extemporaneous additions and deletions during
the course of the evening's presentation.
** Judge, United States Court of Federal Claims, Washington, D.C. The lecturer,
an alumnus of the Fordham University School of Law, acknowledges and is grateful
for the assistance of her law clerk, Andrew M. Goldfrank, a member of the New York
Bar and a 1996 Fordham University School of Law graduate.
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and one whom I admire. John Feerick exemplifies the best in law
school leadership. His commitment to the school, to the individual
student, to the community, and to the improvement of the practice
of law through teaching and doing is a model for all of us.
I am a judge on the United States Court of Federal Claims,
which is a federal trial court located in Washington, D.C.' I love
my current job, in part because each day is different and each day
is a combination of the practical and the academic. You never
know what will happen in the courtroom or in any phase of litiga-
tion. To sit on the court, one has to be appointed by the President
and confirmed by the United States Senate.2 It is a federal trial
court with nationwide jurisdiction, which handles civil suits brought
against the United States - no criminal matters. Many of the
cases involve large dollar claims and complex litigation. Our cases
include contract,3 tax4 and patent5 cases, takings cases under the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution,6 Native American claims,7
military and civilian employee pay cases,8 and vaccine compensa-
1. Pub. L. No. 97-164, ch. 7 § 105(a), 96 Stat. 27, 28 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 171
(1994)). The court's name was changed in 1992 to the "Court of Federal Claims" by
the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 105-572, 106 Stat. 4506
(1992).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 171(a), 172 (1994).
3. The principal statute governing the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims
is known as the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Pursuant to
this statute, the court possesses jurisdiction to entertain any suit for money damages
against the United States which does not sound in tort and which is founded upon the
United States Constitution, an act of Congress, an Executive Order, a regulation of an
Executive Department or any express or implied-in-fact contract with the United
States. See id.
4. See supra note 3. This jurisdiction is concurrent with the jurisdiction that is
possessed by United States District Courts, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1994),
to entertain tax refund suits. In order to obtain jurisdiction a taxpayer is required to
file a claim for a refund with the Internal Revenue Service. See 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a)
(1994).
5. The court possesses exclusive jurisdiction to entertain a suit against the United
States by the owner of a United States patent to recover compensation for the unau-
thorized use by or for the United States of a patented invention. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498(a) (1994); see also 35 U.S.C. § 183 (1994), 22 U.S.C. § 2356 (1994).
6. See supra note 3.
7. Native American claims against the United States are grounded in statute.
See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 70s, 70v (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1994).
8. Jurisdiction over military pay cases, for service members involuntarily retired,
separated or discharged, is found in the money-mandating provisions of the Military
Pay Act, 37 U.S.C. § 204 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
Pursuant to the general principles delineated by the U.S. Supreme Court in United
States v. Wickersham, 201 U.S. 390 (1906), federal civilian employees and former fed-
eral civilian employees may file suit in the Court of Federal Claims to seek monies
allegedly due to them arising out of their employment relationship with the United
1430
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tion cases.9 We have a few other areas of assigned jurisdiction, but
these are the major ones.
Moreover, I have been fortunate in previous jobs to have had
the opportunity to travel, especially in the Pacific region, including
the former Trust Territories of the Pacific, and to help set up court
systems in vastly different cultures. This has given me an addi-
tional perspective on how courts run and how we might wish them
to operate.
When I was asked to do this lecture, I started by doing some
research on past lectures and on the goals of the lecture series. I
tried to select a topic which would be meaningful to the audience
and to which I could contribute. I have been interested in the de-
veloping law of privileged communications, and whether recent de-
velopments are to our benefit or detriment. Thus, I decided this
was an opportunity to review what was happening in the law of
privileged communications, a subject which is present in virtually
every case on my docket, either during discovery or trial.
Shortly thereafter, I left Washington for an out-of-town location,
to conduct the remaining two weeks of a seventeen-week govern-
ment contracts trial having to do with a major construction project
at a national landmark. After fifteen weeks of trial, all the lawyers
and experts involved in the litigation knew each other well. Our
greetings at the start of each trial segment had become friendly and
relaxed.
When I walked into court and welcomed everyone back, one of
the lawyers for the plaintiff said with a smirk, followed by a laugh:
"Big doings in Washington. We can all learn lessons about perjury
and useful tips for deposition and courtroom demeanor from our
Chief Executive." As he finished, I realized that the very next
thing I was about to do was to swear in a key expert witness. What
I am describing was a flash in the pan, informal moment - but, I
recognized that I needed to respond. I could not let the moment
pass and conduct business as usual after the comment that the at-
torney had made for all to hear. Current events had intruded into
our courtroom. It was not a partisan, political issue; it had become
States. The terms and conditions of their employment are governed by statutes and
regulations, and it is the statutes and regulations of Executive Departments that man-
date the payment of money which may form the basis of a federal employee's action
for pay. See Kania v. United States, 650 F.2d 264 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
895 (1981).
9. The jurisdiction of the court includes claims for compensation arising from
vaccination injuries under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Act, codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 300aa-34 (1994).
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a serious practical problem. It was up to me to take charge and it
was necessary to remind everyone present of the seriousness of the
oath to tell the truth each witness must take before offering testi-
mony, and which is at the root of our system of fairness and justice.
I was compelled to offer a lecture on the consequences in my court-
room if I even suspected the possibility of perjury. I began, "Here
in this court we take perjury seriously." With a stern expression, I
continued to lecture for a few moments before I said "Mr. [Jones],
please take the stand. Raise your right hand. Do you swear to tell
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?" I hoped that I had chosen the right words and communi-
cated how serious I was about the significance of sworn testimony.
Imagine in how many other courtrooms around the country similar
encounters or thoughts were intruding.
Later, during our next courtroom break, I called my liaison at
the law school, who had been wonderful to work with, but who,
politely, was breathing down my neck to finalize the topic for the
McNamara Lecture. In addition to addressing the law of privileged
communications, I decided to include discussion about the role of
trial judges to promote truth, fairness and morality in the court-
room, and the dangers to our judicial system if the sanctity of the
oath to tell the truth in legal proceedings is allowed to erode.
The topics of privilege and courtroom ethics are related. At
some point in virtually every case on my docket, whether during
discovery or at trial, both are involved. Moreover, the sanctity of
the oath to tell the truth and the recognized right of citizens to
preserve the privacy of certain types of communications, even dur-
ing litigation, are both fundamental to our system of justice. Like
so many lawyers and members of the public, I have been troubled
by the impact of current events on our system of justice. I was
being given an opportunity to think about issues and interact with a
sophisticated audience on topics of importance.
Tonight's discussion does not address the politics of recent
events. I know some of the principals in the drama and, like every-
one in this room, I have definite views on both the issues and the
personalities. What is important is that, as attorneys - and those
about to become attorneys - we support and enhance a system
which has worked well for this country. Our legal and judicial sys-
tem is not perfect. Although we each have personal gripes and
suggestions for reforms to improve the system, such as how to limit
litigation expenses and how to speed up the process, few of us want
a radical change in how we conduct the resolution of legal conflicts.
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As a society, we share the fundamental ethical and moral values
which form the basis for our system of laws, and we believe in our
legal system. The law students would not be enrolled here, nor
would the law professors be teaching, if they did not endorse the
system.
We must hold on fiercely to the ethical and moral values which
are embedded in our system of conflict resolution and adjudication
and upon which our organized and civilized society is based. Quot-
ing a source from 1894, Justice Benjamin Cardozo, in his collection
of lectures titled The Nature of the Judicial Process, pointed out:
"'Ethical considerations can no more be excluded from the admin-
istration of justice which is the end and purpose of all civil laws
than one can exclude the vital air from his room and live."' 10
We live in a chaotic world. Read the newspapers and you cannot
miss the worldwide turmoil. We also live in a far more pluralistic
and diverse society than our ancestors. In our modern, secular so-
ciety, the common denominator rules are often increasingly diffi-
cult to discern. We do not want the truth to become ephemeral,
malleable, or subjective. We do not want truth to become too
pragmatic, too subjective, or too situational. If one applies situa-
tional ethics, we are left with no basic, fundamental ethics. If
pushed to the extreme, we have ended our right to say we have a
system of truth and justice. In our legal system, the courts, based
on a framework of fundamental values and a dedicated search for
the truth, have provided the stability for conflict resolution.
Although litigants challenge individual decisions, even negative re-
sults are accepted by all but a few.
In the past, an oath was viewed as sacrosanct. Many thought
literally that God would strike you dead if you lied under oath.
Well, even if you do not believe that today, one still ought to be-
lieve that the oath to tell the truth is sacred. For some, perhaps,
the greater deterrent is the fear of prosecution for perjury." Re-
gardless, the goals which law students and attorneys are pursuing
become meaningless if people can come to a trial feeling justified
that it is permissible to lie or to shave the truth. At that point, we
endorse self-interest as the higher goal to the detriment of the
community.
10. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66 (1921)
(quoting Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought, 27 HARV.
L. REV. 605, 731, 734 (1914) (quoting JOHN FORREST DILLON, THE LAWS AND JURIS-
PRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 18 (1894)).
11. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1622 (1994).
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The purpose of the legal system on which we all rely is to sort
out the rights of men, women, children and institutions, and to pro-
mote peaceful co-existence in society. Statutes and regulations are
developed, within the context of a fundamental sense of what is
right and wrong, to announce the applicable rules and to guide
these relationships. Long before judges get involved, citizens,
sometimes with the assistance of lawyers, try to establish relation-
ships in their business and private lives. For example, they enter
into contracts to develop commercial opportunities, to build
houses, and to seal marriages. The goal is to foster honest interac-
tions and to ensure consistency and predictability. All citizens can
then understand and rely upon the rules, thereby providing a uni-
form legal system, including a fair process for conflict resolution.
Judges and courts get involved when those relationships break
down. People go to court when they have irreconcilable differ-
ences. The vast majority of judges will urge you never to come see
them. Unfortunately, we have become a society too prone to liti-
gation. Business is way too good in the court system. Yet, despite
the litigious nature of our society, what is laudable about our sys-
tem of laws is that generally we do not resort immediately to guns
or other means of force to resolve disputes. The majority of our
citizens rely on peaceful means to resolve their disagreements. The
vanguards of protection for our judicial system and society are you,
the lawyers or soon-to-be lawyers. For society to succeed, every
one of you must bring to your jobs the highest ethical and moral
standards each and every day. If you do your jobs well, we judges
will see you and your clients, whether it be in the criminal or civil
system, far less frequently.
The role of a trial judge is more like that of the practitioner than
that of an appellate judge. As judges, we have all taken the same
oath, and on the federal level, have all gone through the same con-
firmation process. We all wear the same black robes and approach
our jobs, hopefully, with the same seriousness of purpose to uphold
the Constitution and the laws of the jurisdiction in which we sit.
Yet, when appellate courts speak, they do not always worry about
how their legal wisdom will impact the rest of us down in the
trenches. They are encouraged by our system to be legal purists.
Standing in the halls of the law school in which I got my start, I
am reminded of the many times that, as law students, we intently
debated the meaning of individual legal points for hours. We be-
came caught up in the minor nuances of a single sentence, often
without remembering that the cases we were intellectualizing in-
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volved real plaintiffs and real defendants. I still enjoy the intellec-
tual debate and have ample opportunity to exercise my intellectual
curiosity along with my research and writing skills as an adjunct
law professor, teaching third-year law students; during my tours as
a visiting fellow on university campuses, teaching on the under-
graduate level; and while crafting the complex bench trial and mo-
tion practice opinions we generate in our court.
However, I started my legal career as an Assistant District At-
torney here in New York City. I like it where the real people are. I
like the calculated chaos of the trial court. I like the unpredictabil-
ity of witnesses, who often bring excitement to cases by offering
insights and surprising testimony they may not have previously
shared with their attorneys. I welcome the puzzle-like challenge of
unscrambling the testimony and exhibits of lengthy and complex
cases. Frankly, I enjoy the challenges of the unpredictable and the
requirement to make on-the-spot decisions, such as momentary ev-
identiary rulings.
Perhaps I flatter myself, but I believe that the trial judge has a
key role in our society. The role of the trial judge is to be a combi-
nation gatekeeper and referee on the adjudicatory ballfield on
which claimants face off against each other. It is the mandate of
the trial judge to strip the emotions out of the case and to provide
guidance on how to resolve the issues in contention, sometimes
with the help of a jury and sometimes on his or her own. Ulti-
mately, the trial judge must take the panoply of facts and apply
them to a rational framework, either issuing jury instructions or, in
the case of a bench trial, by issuing final opinions.
If we, the trial judges, do our jobs well, we can resolve the cases
without the need for further adjudication. As trial judges, we can
meet our obligations by disposing of as many cases as possible dur-
ing pretrial proceedings, and by conducting supportable, focused
trials which result in decisions that reflect the absence of reversible
error. I know in my chambers, one of our goals is to issue well-
reasoned and well-written decisions, which fully find and articulate
the essential facts and recite and apply the applicable law, so that
the need for expending additional time and money on appellate
reviews or remands will be kept to a minimum. The losers should
be able to easily understand the basis of the decision. The hope is
that appeals will be lodged only when there is a clear legal issue on
which reasonable men and women can disagree. If the trial judge
does a proper job, even if an appeal is filed, the scope of the appel-
late review will be carefully delineated and minimized. Remands
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from an appellate court for arbitrary and capricious fact-finding are
a sure sign that the trial court has failed and not done its job well.
To promote a continued belief in and reliance on our legal and
judicial system, what is the role of the trial judge? As members of
the bar and under the additional governance of the Canons of Judi-
cial Ethics, trial judges need to be sure that we not only facilitate
the resolution of litigation, but that we also do so in ways which are
consistent with our moral and ethical obligations. In the search for
the truth, judges must remain the stalwart defenders of the funda-
mental values our justice system seeks to preserve.
There are tensions inherent in an adversarial system. Litigants
sometimes become consumed with winning; regardless of the
method. Judges must provide guidance to ensure that society's val-
ues are not eroded, even when, on occasion, to do so might impede
litigation. The need in the courtroom to balance the hunt for infor-
mation, as part of the search for the truth, against intrusion into
acknowledged privacy rights, which are also central to our society,
is an example of when judicial intervention is required. As a trial
judge, I have a hunger for information. I want to decide cases for
the right reasons. I do not want the parties to withhold relevant
information. I do not want to be fooled because one party has de-
liberately withheld critical information, because one party has been
able to hire better experts, because one party has had more finan-
cial resources for investigation, or because one attorney simply was
a better advocate. Missing important, relevant information is one
of a trial judge's biggest fears.
Almost each day, I find myself having to balance my need and
thirst for information, against the possibility of allowing inappro-
priate intrusions into areas society has traditionally and properly
considered private for good reasons, such as the right to avoid self-
incrimination, the right to the protection of trade secrets, or the
right for citizens to have privileged communications. Tonight I will
explore with you one such exemplary area of the law that fre-
quently arises during the pretrial discovery proceedings and at
trial, namely, the issue of privileged communications.
Historically, society has placed value on privacies such as the
right to consult an attorney without oversight, the privileges of gov-
ernment officials to deliberate and reach difficult decisions in pri-
vate, the right to seek certain types of medical assistance in private,
the ability to seek religious counseling in confidence, and the sanc-
tity of marital relations. The invocation of these rights in a court-
room falls under the term "privileged communications." A
1436
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number of the recent challenges involving the law of privilege,
however, have suggested to some that we are approaching a
merger of necessity and law, and that we should be wary of al-
lowing our legal system of conflict resolution to become captive to
the needs of the moment. For example, some have questioned
whether a federal secret service agent should have been forced to
testify against a President, whom he or she is protecting in the in-
terests of national security.12 At the same time, a difficult dilemma
arises for an attorney representing a client. The attorney is obli-
gated to represent the client to the best of his or her ability. Thus,
an attorney may attempt to avoid privilege protection, attempt to
assert inapplicable privileges, or even attempt to create new privi-
leges to protect his or her client
It is the role of the courts to depoliticize the issues and to create
rational and positive rules of process for use in litigation, including
those in the area of privileged communications. These procedural
guidelines must make long-term sense and uphold our traditional
values. We need rules to conduct litigation, and we need predict-
ability regarding those rules. Appellate courts can help us to de-
fine the rules of privilege. Trial courts, such as the federal trial
court in which I preside, must apply those rules and continue to
identify issues which need further definition by appellate courts.
Regarding the rules of privilege, which I will review as defined in
the federal courts, one must start with the basic principal that no
one can exercise the privilege to lie. Even in a criminal proceed-
ing, a defendant has the right not to respond by invoking the Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination, but not the right
to lie. The obligation to tell the truth during the course of litigation
is not negotiable. The oath a witness takes, whether at a deposi-
tion, in an affidavit, or during a trial, must have meaning.
At the core of the current, and continuing, controversy sur-
rounding the evolving law of privilege is the idea that certain com-
munications should remain confidential and outside the purview of
litigation. "Privilege is 'rooted in the imperative need for confi-
dence and trust."" 3 This principal is juxtaposed against the nor-
mally predominant rule that all relevant and vital evidence is to be
presented to the trier of fact in order to ascertain the truth.14 The
public's expectation that certain communications will remain in
12. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
13. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996) (quoting Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
14. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50.
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confidence creates an absolute need for reliability and certainty in
the law of privilege and the ability to predict that particular discus-
sions will remain protected. As emphasized by the United States
Supreme Court: "An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to
be certain but which results in widely varying applications, is little
better than no privilege at all."15
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 focuses on the doctrine of privi-
lege in the federal courts. It is a general rule which does not iden-
tify specific codified privileges, but which provides that privileges
will be recognized under the federal common law in light of reason
and experience.16 The United States Supreme Court, in Jaffee v.
Redmond, promoted the notion that the federal courts could define
new privileges, and stressed that Rule 501 "did not freeze the law
governing the privileges of witnesses in federal trials at a particular
point in our history, but rather directed federal courts to 'continue
the evolutionary development of testimonial privileges' ,,17 based
on "reason and experience."' 8
This recognition of the power of the federal courts to adopt new
confidential communication privileges, however, should not be in-
terpreted to suggest that the courts intend to embrace liberally var-
ious proposed privileges. In 1990, the United States Supreme
Court emphasized that "although Rule 501 manifests a congres-
sional desire not to freeze the law of privilege but rather to provide
the courts with flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-
case basis, we are disinclined to exercise this authority expan-
sively."' 9 This judicial resolve, coupled with the established legal
15. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
16. See FED. R. EvID. 501:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, govern-
ment, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the princi-
ples of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil ac-
tions and proceedings with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to
which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, per-
son, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined
in accordance with State law.
Id.
17. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8-9 (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47).
18. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 46 (citing Hawkins v. United States, 359 U.S. 74, 79
(1958)).
19. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (citing Tram-
mel, 445 U.S. at 47); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (stating
that "these exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created
nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth").
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hurdles that a newly created privilege must surmount, indicate that
the addition of new absolute privileges in the federal courts will not
be frequent.20 For example, the United States Supreme Court has
rejected a university's assertion of privilege for academic peer re-
view process files after finding no constitutional, statutory or his-
torical basis for the creation of a privilege;21 has rejected an
accountant/auditor-client work product privilege; 22 has rejected a
state legislator's speech and debate privilege;23 has rejected a "priv-ilege to the editorial process of a media defendant; ' 24 and the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit has rejected a Secret Service protective function privilege.
A litigant who seeks to invoke a novel privilege in federal court
has the burden of establishing the privilege. This burden involves
demonstrating that the asserted privilege "promotes sufficiently
important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence. "26
The United States Supreme Court has noted that "an asserted priv-
ilege must also 'serv[e] public ends.' "27 In addition to these signifi-
cant private and public interests, it is likewise important for a
federal court to consider the "reason and experience" of the states
in enacting or recognizing a privilege.28
The well-accepted privileges embraced by our society and en-
dorsed by the courts are rooted in goals in which our society places
special values; for example, the sanctity of marriage, the priest/pen-
itent relationship, the right to counsel, and the national security of
the country. Wigmore on Evidence has articulated four prerequi-
sites to establish a privilege against the disclosure of communica-
tions: (1) the communication must originate in a communication
that will not be disclosed; (2) the elements of confidentiality must
20. See, e.g., University of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 195; United States v. Arthur
Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984); United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 373
(1980); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169 (1979); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No.
98-148 (NHJ), 1998 WL 272884, at *5 (D.D.C. May 22, 1998), affd sub nom. In re
Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1079.
21. See University of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 195.
22. See Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. at 817-18.
23. See Gillock, 445 U.S. at 373.
24. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 169.
25. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1078, affg sub nom. In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at *5.
26. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
27. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
28. Id. at 12-13 ("We have previously observed that the policy decisions of the
States bear on the question whether federal courts should recognize a new privilege
or amend the coverage of an existing one.").
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be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation-
ship between the parties; (3) the relationship must be one which
the community believes ought to be fostered; and (4) the injury
from disclosure to the relationship would be greater than the bene-
fit gained for the correct disposition of the litigation.29
One privilege that warrants discussion is the attorney-client privi-
lege, which is not only one of the most frequently invoked privi-
leges, but also one of the oldest of the confidential communications
privileges.3 ° The United States Supreme Court has emphasized
that the attorney-client privilege's "purpose is to encourage full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law
and administration of justice."'3 1 This privilege is premised on the
rationale "that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends
and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being
fully informed by the client. ' 32 Commentators note that the attor-
ney-client privilege is both intellectually and contextually under-
stood by lawyers and judges, rendering these practitioners
sympathetic to applying and enforcing the doctrine.33
Under the attorney-client privilege, a client seeking legal advice
has a permanent protection from disclosure of confidential com-
munications with an attorney acting in her or his legal capacity.34
Likewise, it has been accepted for a long time that, except in lim-
ited circumstances generally in the criminal justice context, that the
attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client .3  The
privilege attaches once a client communicates with an attorney for
the purposes of seeking legal services or advice even if the lawyer
is not retained.36 The privilege, however, may not be invoked by a
client who hires an attorney to seek services or advice that a non-
lawyer could readily handle. The privilege "protects only those dis-
29. See 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
30. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2084
(1998) (citing Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389; Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470
(1888)).
31. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389.
32. Id.
33. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin & Daniel J. Capra, 2 FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 697-98 & n.14 (7th ed. 1998) (citing Developments in
the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450 (1985)).
34. See id. (citing 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2290-92).
35. See Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2088.
36. See, e.g., In re Auclair, 961 F.2d 65, 69 (5th Cir. 1992); In re Bevill, Bresler &
Schulman Asset Management Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 124 n.1 (3d Cir. 1986).
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closures necessary to obtain informed legal advice. ' 37 For exam-
ple, "[a] business that gets marketing advice from a lawyer does
not acquire a privilege in the bargain; so too a business that obtains
the services of a records custodian from a member of the bar."
38
The attorney-client privilege may not be invoked by the client if
the communication is later disclosed to a third-party, not an agent
of the attorney from whom advice was sought, and if the client
either did not wish to keep the materials confidential or the client
did not take adequate measures under the circumstances to pre-
vent disclosure of the privileged communications. 39 An exception
to the general rule against invoking the privilege for disclosure to
third-parties is the "common-interest" doctrine which extends the
attorney-client privilege to multiple clients pursuing a common in-
terest, who are represented by separate attorneys and who jointly
compile communications that would otherwise qualify as privi-
leged.4" Any such "common-interest" client may invoke the privi-
37. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
38. In re Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622, 626-27 (7th Cir. 1988).
39. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d 342, 354-55 (4th Cir. 1994); In
re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Gann, 732 F.2d 714,
723 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984); National Helium Corp. v. United
States, 219 Ct. Cl. 612, 614 (1979).
40. See, e.g., In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir.
1996), cert. denied sub nor. Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 520 U.S.
1193 (1997); United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1392 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. de-
nied, 520 U.S. 1239 (1997); United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 244 (2d Cir.
1989).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in a recent decision
addressed the definition of common-interest in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Office of President v. Office of
Gen. Counsel, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997). The Office of the Independent Counsel, on be-
half of the grand jury, sought notes from meetings, held after the grand jury testimony
of Hilary Rodham Clinton, that were attended by the First Lady, members of the
White House Counsel's Office and the First Lady's personal attorney. See id. at 913-
14. The court suggested that the First Lady attempted to invoke the common-interest
doctrine by arguing that she and the White House were pursuing a common interest
that "involved Mrs. Clinton in her personal capacity, her personal attorney, Mrs. Clin-
ton as a representative of the White House.... and the White House's official attor-
neys." Id. at 922. The court stated that:
there is lacking in this situation the requisite common interest between cli-
ents, who are Mrs. Clinton in her personal capacity and the White House.
Mrs. Clinton's interest in the OIC's [Office of the Independent Counsel] in-
vestigation is, naturally, avoiding prosecution, or else minimizing the conse-
quences if the OIC decides to pursue charges against her. One searches in
vain for any interest of the White House which corresponds to Mrs. Clin-
ton's personal interest.
The OIC's investigation can have no legal, factual, or even strategic effect on
the White House as an institution. Certainly action by the OIC may occupy
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lege, unless it is waived by the individual who contributed the
confidential communication.41
Recent decisions have placed in the news headlines the question
of to what extent the attorney-client privilege applies in the context
of advice sought from government attorneys. In a civil action,
when the government is the client, and government officials make
confidential communications to government attorneys for the pur-
pose of eliciting legal advice as opposed to for policy-making pur-
poses, it appears that the government client may invoke the
attorney-client privilege.42
A government attorney-government client privilege, however,
does not appear to apply in the context of a criminal grand jury
proceeding because, "the strong public interest in honest govern-
ment and in exposing wrongdoing by public officials would be ill-
served by recognition of a governmental attorney-client privilege
applicable in criminal proceedings inquiring into the actions of
public officials."43 Thus, "[a]n official who fears he or she may
have violated the criminal law and wishes to speak with an attorney
in confidence should speak with a private attorney, not a govern-
ment attorney. 44
Society and the courts also have embraced a psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege. The United States Supreme Court, in Jaffee v. Red-
mond, recognized that confidential communications to licensed
psychologists and psychiatrists, and even to "licensed social work-
ers in the course of psychotherapy," were entitled to protection
from testimony as privileged.45 The Supreme Court, however,
the time of White House staff members, may vacate positions in the White
House if any of its personnel are indicted, and may harm the President and
Mrs. Clinton politically. But even if we assume that it is proper for the
White House to press political concerns upon us, we do not believe that any
of these incidental effects on the White House are sufficient to place that
governmental institution in the same canoe as Mrs. Clinton, whose personal
liberty is potentially at stake.
Id. at 922-23. The court closed the discussion on common-interest by stating that "the
White House and Mrs. Clinton have failed to establish that the interests of the Re-
public coincide with her personal interests." Id. (noting White House's citation of
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 449 (1977)).
41. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 406 F. Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
42. See Town of Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 968 F.2d 1438
(1st Cir. 1992); Coastal Corp. v. Duncan, 86 F.R.D. 514 (D. Del. 1980).
43. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 913-14 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Office of President v. Office of Indep. Counsel, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997).
44. Id.
45. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1996). The holding of the case appears
to apply solely to statements made for the purposes of therapy:
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qualified the invocation of the privilege when stating that "we do
not doubt that there are situations in which the privilege must give
way, for example, if a serious harm to the patient or to others can
be averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist.
4 6
A logical extension of this decision might be the validation of a
physician-patient privilege. In Jaffee v. Redmond, however, the
Supreme Court specifically distinguished the role of a physician
from that of a psychotherapist by suggesting that confidential com-
munications were not imperative to the physician-patient relation-
ship.47 Nonetheless, almost every state has legislatively approved
some form of a physician-patient relationship,48 despite the fact
that the doctor-patient privilege has not been recognized in the
federal courts.49
Dating back to medieval English roots, the federal courts also
recognize a marital privilege, but have rejected a parent-child privi-
lege. The marital privilege began as a spousal disqualification from
testifying on the theory that "since husband and wife were one, and
that since the woman had no recognized separate legal existence,
the husband was that one."' 50 This rule evolved into a privilege that
Effective psychotherapy.., depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and
trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure
of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of
the problems for which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of
confidential communications made during counseling sessions may cause
embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the mere possibility of disclo-
sure may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for
successful treatment.
Id. at 10. In asserting that the privilege is in the public interest, the Supreme Court
stated:
The psychotherapist privilege serves the public interest by facilitating the
provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a
mental or emotional problem. The mental health of our citizenry, no less
than its physical health, is a public good of transcendent importance.
Id. at 11.
46. Id. at 18 n.19.
47. Id. at 10 ("Treatment by a physician for physical ailments can often proceed
successfully on the basis of the physical examination, objective information supplied
by the patient, and the results of diagnostic testing.").
48. See. 2 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 731 & n.137 (citing Develop-
ments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1533 (1985)).
49. See, e.g., Patterson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 70 F.3d 503, 506 (7th Cir.), reh'g denied
(1995) (rejecting federal physician-patient privilege and application of state privilege);
United States v. Bercier, 848 F.2d 917, 920-21 (8th Cir. 1988) (rejecting federal physi-
cian-patient privilege and collecting cases).
50. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980).
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allowed either spouse, no longer considered one entity, to prevent
the other from giving adverse testimony unless both consented. 1
There are two recognized interspousal privileges that arise from
a marital relationship: the adverse testimonial privilege and the
confidential communications privilege. The basic premise of the
adverse testimonial privilege is to foster the sanctity and harmony
of the marriage relationship at the time that testimony is de-
manded. 3 In contrast, the confidential communications privilege,
which is intended to protect marital communications at the time
that they are made from one spouse to another, may be invoked by
either spouse, even if the other spouse is willing to give testi-
mony. 4 There are, however, several exceptions to the confidential
communications privilege, such as the crime-fraud exception.
Moreover, in the event that a spouse is prosecuted or sued for vic-
timizing a family member, in the case of both marital privileges,
there exists an exception that allows the testimony. 6 Despite the
similarities to the sanctity of the privileges adherent to the spousal
relationship, however, the federal courts uniformly have rejected a
parent-child privilege, thereby opening the door for a parent to tes-
tify against or about a child, and vice-versa, for a child to testify
about a parent. 7
The federal courts consistently have recognized a clergy-penitent
privilege. The case law regarding clergy-communicant communica-
tions, however, distinguishes between religious or pastoral counsel-
ing, as opposed to nonreligious counseling.5 8
51. See id. at 43-46.
52. See id. at 40.
53. Id. at 44.
54. See United States v. Lofton, 957 F.2d 476, 477 (7th Cir. 1992).
55. See United States v. Estes, 793 F.2d 465, 467 (2d Cir. 1986).
56. United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1992).
57. See In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1150 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Roe
v. United States, 520 U.S. 1253 (1997). In the wake of the Office of Independent
Counsel's various efforts to investigate the President, public concern arose over the
lack of a parent-child privilege after Monica Lewinsky's mother was subpoenaed to
testify before the grand jury. The concern resulted in a proposed bill in the in the
105th Congress, specifically H.R. No. 3577, that would have amended Federal Rule of
Evidence 501 to include a parent-child privilege. A similar bill was introduced in the
106th Congress into the House of Representatives on February 3, 1999 (H.R. 522).
The current proposed bill would not alter the common law approach under Federal
Rule of Evidence 501, but would add a single codified privilege protecting the parent-
child relationship, to be titled Federal Rule of Evidence 502.
58. Compare In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 384 (3d Cir. 1990)
(holding discussions during pastoral family counseling session were privileged), with
United States v. Dube, 820 F.2d 886, 889 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding conversations with
pastor regarding avoidance of tax liability were nonreligious and not privileged).
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To promote our fundamental belief in protecting free speech, the
federal courts have recognized a qualified journalism privilege. In
1972, however, the United States Supreme Court in Branzburg v.
Hayes,59 held that a journalist must provide a grand jury with infor-
mation relevant to an investigation, including confidential sources.
In the federal court system, the holding of Branzburg v. Hayes has
been limited to the grand jury context.6" A journalist's privilege,
however, is qualified and "the absence of confidentiality may be
considered in the balance of competing interests as a factor that
diminishes the journalist's, and the public's, interest in non-disclo-
sure."6 1 For example, in Herbert v. Lando,62 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that this qualified privilege is outweighed in libel cases
because otherwise the privilege would be the equivalent of a re-
porter's or editor's immunity from suit.63
The federal courts also have recognized a number of different
government privileges, beyond the government attorney-govern-
ment client privilege discussed above. These include a state and
military secrets privilege, a deliberative process privilege, an execu-
tive privilege, and a law enforcement privilege. A number of these
privileges have been invoked during investigations by the Office of
Independent Counsel.
The courts have shown deference to privilege claims that are
premised upon state or military secrets in which national security is
implicated. 64 Moreover, when the a state secrets privilege is trig-
gered, the privilege is absolute, whether claimed in a civil suit or a
criminal prosecution.65 The privilege also may be invoked by those
for whom the exposure of state secrets is required for the purposes
of putting on a defense, thereby precluding the litigation or prose-
cution altogether.66
An Executive Branch agency or governmental entity may invoke
the deliberative process privilege that is intended to protect a gov-
ernment's decision-making process by precluding disclosure of
59. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
60. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397, 401-02 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied sub nom. Scarce v. United States, 510 U.S. 1041 (1994); Zerelli v. Smith, 656
F.2d 705, 711-12 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
61. Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1993).
62. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
63. See id. at 169-71.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953); Bareford v. Gen-
eral Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1141 (5th Cir.), opinion vacated in part (1992).
65. See Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S.
1154 (1996); Bareford v. General Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d at 1143.
66. See Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 547 (2d Cir. 1991).
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predecisional government communications.67 The deliberative
process privilege is designed so that
it protects creative debate and candid consideration of alterna-
tives within an agency, and, thereby, improves the quality of
agency policy decisions. Second, it protects the public from the
confusion that would result from premature exposure to discus-
sions occurring before the policies affecting it had actually been
settled upon. And third, it protects the integrity of the decision-
making process itself by confirming that "officials should be
judged by what they decided[,] not for matters they considered
before making up their minds.",
68
The courts routinely apply the privilege to shield intra-govern-
ment documents.69 Exercise of the privilege, however, does have
limitations so that a document only may qualify for protection
under the privilege if it is both predecisional and deliberative.7 °
Therefore, "purely factual material contained in deliberative mem-
oranda and severable from its context would generally be available
for discovery. "71
Moreover, when the deliberative process privilege is invoked,
the need to protect the intra-governmental information is balanced
against the citizen's need for the information.72 Some of the fac-
tors to be considered to assess the requisite balancing are:
(i) the relevance of the evidence sought to be protected; (ii) the
availability of other evidence; (iii) the "seriousness" of the liti-
gation and the issues involved; (iv) the role of the government in
the litigation; and (v) the possibility of future timidity by gov-
ernment employees who will be forced to recognize that their
secrets are violable.73
67. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150-55 (1975); In re Sealed
Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
68. Jordan v. Department of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 772-73 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (foot-
notes omitted) (quoting Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 482
F.2d 710, 718 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 168 (1975)).
69. See, e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); Providence Journal Co. v. United
States Dep't of the Army, 981 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1992); Quarles v. Department of the
Navy, 893 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
70. Quarles, 893 F.2d at 392.
71. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. at 87-88.
72. See id. at 89.
73. In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 577, 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)
(citations omitted); see also In re Subpoena Served upon the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, and Sec'y of Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 967 F.2d 630, 634 (D.C.
Cir. 1992).
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The privilege must be invoked by the head of an agency or de-
partment that controls the desired government information and
not by the government attorney that is litigating the case.74 The
logic of this requirement stems from the fact that the withholding
of government documents is at odds with the concept of open gov-
ernance and access to the government by the citizenry.
A Presidential privilege is also available in appropriate circum-
stances. The United States Supreme Court has held that there is a
presumptive, albeit qualified, privilege for Presidential communi-
cations made in confidence 75 and in the course of performance of
official duties by the Chief Executive.76
The rationale has been explained by the Supreme Court as based
on possible foreign policy involvement and implication of state
secrets,77 as well as on the Chief Executive's role in governmental
decision-making, in which there is
necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objec-
tive, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-
making. A President and those who assist him must be free to
explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and mak-
ing decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to
express except privately.78
The invocation of the Presidential privilege by an occupant of
the White House was examined by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit and found to encompass
factual and deliberative communications. 79 Despite the unique
role and relationship of the Chief Executive, the court, however,
held that "the deliberative process privilege can be overcome by a
sufficient showing of need. ' 80 The fact that the evidence sought
was the sole source for a grand jury criminal investigation was
found to outweigh the White House's interest in confidentiality.8
This balancing is not dissimilar to that undertaken when consider-
ing the broader Executive Branch, governmental deliberative pro-
cess privilege.82
74. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Diamond, 137 F.R.D. 634, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
75. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708, 711 (1974).
76. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
77. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710-11.
78. Id. at 708.
79. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 737.
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The law enforcement privilege is intended to "prevent disclosure
of law enforcement techniques and procedures, to preserve the
confidentiality of sources, to protect witnesses and law enforce-
ment personnel, to safeguard the privacy of individuals involved in
an investigation, and otherwise to prevent interference with an in-
vestigation. ' '83 This privilege is qualified in that the state interest
must be balanced against an individual's right to mount an effective
defense.8 4 "Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or the
contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the de-
fense of the accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a
cause, the privilege must give way."85 In an informant case, the
presumption of confidentiality is removed, instead the onus is
placed upon the government to establish that an informant ex-
pected the communications to be in confidence and his or her iden-
86tity anonymous.
Having briefly reviewed the law of privilege, we return to the
role of the trial judge who must utilize the privilege rules and
others which have been developed for use in court proceedings.
Let me offer a few thoughts on how judges can utilize those rules of
process, while at the same time promoting fairness and the search
for the truth.
First, the trial judge should be the role model in the courtroom
through his or her personal demeanor and work habits. The judge
must be courteous to all and treat everyone with respect. The
judge must ensure that lawyers are deferential to one another and
to the witnesses. Civility in the courtroom should not just be an
often-pronounced goal, it must become a reality. The judge also
must be willing to work as hard as the attorneys and everyone else
in the courtroom. For example, abbreviated trial hours or long
breaks for lunches protract trials and give a bad name to the pro-
fession. The judge must come into the courtroom, whether for pre-
trial proceedings or for trial, well-prepared to discuss the issues and
to receive the evidence. This includes familiarity with the facts of
the case and the applicable law. The parties will be able to tell if
the judge is prepared or not.
Second, judges should retain the formalism, the familiar prac-
tices and the efficiencies of the courtroom, although not as goals in
83. In re Dep't of Investigation v. Myerson, 856 F.2d 481, 484 (2d Cir. 1988) (cita-
tions omitted).
84. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957).
85. Id.
86. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 177, 181 (1993).
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and of themselves. Remember, fifty percent of the people who
come to court will lose. Those litigants are more likely to believe
that they have received a fair trial if the court follows comfortable,
predictable and established patterns. If courtroom practice be-
comes too informal or too uncontrolled, if the case takes too long,
or if those in the courtroom are not treated with respect, the loser
is more likely to believe that the trial was not fair.
Formalism, however, does not mean arrogance or stuffiness.
Lawyers and judges must speak plain English. An attorney who
liberally sprinkles his or her speech with Latin phrases or long un-
common words engages in a dangerous practice. As a judge, I
might get annoyed, but juries and witnesses may not understand or
be receptive to the unfamiliar words or Latin phrases and may dis-
miss the argument.
Third, in law school, and thereafter as lawyers, we are trained to
split hairs and play word games, for example, when we engage in
statutory construction or the interpretation of a contract. Lawyers
are proud of themselves when they can distinguish their case from
otherwise adverse precedent or statutes. If fairness and the better-
ment of society are our basic goals, the over-legalization and the
hairsplitting should be of concern to all. We should question
whether to teach our students to parse sentences the way one wit-
ness, a member of the bar, did during testimony. Without allowing
our personal politics to enter into our understanding, should we
not question ourselves when we are quibbling about the definition
of the words "is" and "was," as follows: "It depends upon what the
meaning of the word is means. If 'is' means 'is, and never has
been,' that's one thing. If it means, 'there is none,' that was a com-
pletely true statement."87 Fortunately, the average jury is not gen-
erally comprised of lawyers. Juries are excellent antidotes to our
profession because they often see beyond the legalistic word
games.
Many members of the public unfortunately see lawyers as the
ultimate pragmatists, who will say anything to protect a client.
Some attorneys are comfortable with that image as part of their
representational duties, some are not. If anyone testifying in my
courtroom were to play with the definitions of the words "is" and
"was," my ears would immediately perk up and I would be care-
fully assessing that witness's credibility. So, I think, would the av-
87. Videotaped testimony of William J. Clinton, President of the United States,
Washington, D.C., before Office of Independent Counsel Grand Jury, Segment 3
(Aug. 17, 1998), available in 1998 WL 644125.
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erage juror. There is danger in appearing too cute. Therefore,
even if ethics and morality fail to deter an attorney or a witness
from cutting fine lines, those same individuals should be fore-
warned that over-legalization and over-definition of words often
backfire on a witness.
Fourth, judges should not promote doing things the way they
have always been done merely for that reason. The technological
revolution has hit the courtroom. For example, we now have mod-
ern capabilities such as smart courtrooms, real-time reporting, the
ability to conduct electronic discovery without the exchange of pa-
per documents, teleconferencing of witnesses during depositions
and trials, and electronic filing. Technology should be used to facil-
itate and speed up trials within the formal and familiar context.
Judges have an obligation to promote fairness by keeping cases
on their docket moving. Litigation is expensive and generally
comes into court only after the issues have been percolating for a
considerable length of time. Each of us have those embarrassing
cases that for one reason or another have gotten bogged down for
too long. And, while judges are, "so to speak," on permanent re-
tainer, time is money for those involved in the litigation. Faith in
our legal system is eroded when the expectation is that going to
court is almost useless because it will take so long to resolve a dis-
pute through the judicial process. Moreover, if a trial takes too
long, it is harder and harder to bring the parties together for a pos-
sible settlement. Positions harden, so much money has already
been invested that a little more hardly matters, and attorneys' fees
sometimes become the problem. For example, even if the parties
want to settle at a late stage in the litigation, the attorneys may be
the last ones willing to bend.
The new technology can be a boon to those judges who are ready
to embrace it. Utilization of technology can make our system far
more efficient, and after an initial investment, less costly. For ex-
ample, I am involved in a large military contract litigation, with
millions of pages of documents which are classified for national se-
curity purposes. We are conducting paperless discovery by ex-
changing tapes of scanned documents electronic briefing. This
facilitates security protection, avoids exchanging an original and
two copies of millions of pages of written material, and, because of
research software, makes searching the documents far more
efficient.
Fifth, judges must take control of the courtroom. Judges have an
obligation to assure fair, expeditious litigation opportunities for all
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parties. Sometimes in our adversarial system this becomes a true
challenge for the judge. Hard-fighting adversaries can get carried
away, either on purpose or for effect, while playing to the judge
and/or the jury, or because they lose control. Often, there is a vast
disparity between the skill levels of litigators. A judge also has spe-
cial responsibilities with non-attorney pro se litigants, who have a
hard time understanding and complying with the rules we lawyers
have developed for the orderly processing of litigation.88 While be-
ing supportive of the pro se party, however, the judge also must
keep the proceeding moving and avoid tipping the balance of a
trial in either the direction of the plaintiff or the defendant. Judges
have to remind practitioners that winning is not everything, some-
thing many litigators lose sight of in the heat of battle. How one
wins also matters. Cases should be decided for the right reasons,
not, for example, because one attorney is more able or a better
actor than the other.
A controversial aspect of ensuring a fair trial is whether a trial
judge should intercede during testimony to create balance, for ex-
ample by assisting a counsel who is foundering as a result of his or
her own ineptitude, and missing the critical points with a witness.
Much discussion has been generated on this subject among mem-
bers of the bar. Most litigators fervently argue that in an adversary
system a judge has absolutely no business intervening, and that
plaintiffs and defendants have chosen their own lawyers. Unfortu-
nately, not all litigants can choose their own counsel. The econom-
ics of litigation are such that not everyone can afford equally
competent counsel of their choice. Assigned counsel, of course,
can be the most fervent counsel. Public defenders, legal aid society
attorneys, and even students in clinics, while often quite young and
less experienced, often do a better job than some members of the
private bar. Unfortunately, as a trial judge, I see vastly mixed
levels of competence.
As I said earlier, I happen to believe that my job as a trial judge
is to make sure that we decide cases for the right reasons. My law
clerks hear me repeat this phrase over and over. You have to re-
member that behind the attorneys - good, bad, or indifferent -
there are real plaintiffs and defendants who deserve, and should
get, the best the court system has to offer. Morally, I have trouble
sitting back and watching a trial conclude with what I feel is the
88. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (requiring that allega-
tions contained in pro se complaint be held to "less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers"), reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972).
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wrong result. I am not suggesting that my judgment is perfect, but,
I do have an obligation to do the best job I can. Generally, there-
fore, in egregious situations, I gently try to help the process. One
of the harshest forms of intervention is for the judge to ask addi-
tional questions of a witness when, as a judge, you think the impor-
tant issues have not been reached or a witness is lying. Lawyers
often object. One solution is to offer the attorneys an opportunity
to ask additional questions after the judge has asked his or her
questions. On occasion, the insertion into the process is to inquire
of an attorney whether he or she objects to the admission of a doc-
ument. The reactions to bad lawyering can be instinctive and inad-
vertent. As a judge, you also try to control your body language,
but sometimes it is so painful to watch, that complete composure is
hard to accomplish. As a trial judge, you have to make hard, on
the spot decisions regarding both what to do and what not to do.
The general presumption is certainly not to interfere, but, some-
times I feel I have to or an injustice will be done.
Sixth, a good trial judge must be creative. Every day in a trial
court should be undertaken with an eagerness to approach new
challenges. Although there are helpful instruction books, there are
no form books for a good trial. The unexpected happens all the
time. Few requests for evidentiary rulings are the same. I have
been doing this job for a long time now, and virtually no two cases
present the same problems. That is probably why I enjoy my job so
much. I am on a train that goes a mile a minute, but it never goes
in a straight line. Using available tools such as docket management
techniques, pretrial motion practice, stipulations, test cases, and
both traditional and non-traditional alternative dispute resolution
("ADR"), judges can speed up the resolution of cases. At the
same time, while eagerly searching for new conflict resolution tech-
niques, one also must be careful to use ADR and other techniques
wisely and only when appropriate. It is up to the judge to provide
the leadership so that naturally cautious litigators are willing to in-
vestigate and try new methods.
Seventh, while creativity to solve procedural problems is a vital
skill, an able trial judge must apply the law with intelligence and
consistency. One of the rules we operate under in the court system
is the law of precedential decisions. Blind adherence to precedent
is not what I am advocating. It is not the role of a trial judge,
however, to disregard existing case precedents. In our system, ap-
pellate courts, and most especially the Supreme Court, are dele-
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gated the primary responsibility to effect dramatic changes in the
law not based on statutory change.
As a lawyer, you study the judge assigned to your case. You try
to discern a pattern in his or her legal leanings and temperament.
You try to figure out in advance how the judge conducts proceed-
ings. If, after studying your assigned trial judge, you conclude he
or she takes each case on a fact-by-fact basis, does a good job of
applying the existing law and rules of procedure, and also runs a
tight courtroom, with high performance expectations, I personally
would consider that profile a compliment. I also would consider it
a compliment if the bar which appears before me cannot predict
the outcome of cases assigned to me because I am not labeled as a
plaintiff's or defendant's judge on any particular type of case or
issue. I want a reputation as a fair judge.
Eighth, the trial judge also has a duty to ensure that attorneys
who appear in his or her courtroom comply with their own ethical
obligations, such as the duties of diligence, confidentiality, conflict
of interest, knowing when to decline or to terminate representa-
tion, and knowing when a motion or claim is meritorious and, thus,
worth pursuing. As members of the bar and officers of the court, it
should go without saying that attorneys will act ethically. For ex-
ample, in a perfect world, judges could trust attorneys not to exer-
cise inappropriate privileges. Unfortunately, although most
lawyers do behave at the highest levels, some do not. For example,
as a judge, I should be able to expect candor toward the tribunal.
During discovery I will say to an attorney, "Mr. [Jones], if you tell
me as an officer of the court that the documents which have been
subpoenaed do not exist, I will have to take your word for it."
Sometimes I say it with a sinking feeling. As a judge, you hope to
trust attorneys to abide by the proper ethical boundaries. Judges
look to lawyers in their courtrooms to be truthful with the court, to
not merely be an advocate for his or her client, but also to do so
honestly and forthrightly.
When I attended law school at Fordham, we did not have re-
quired ethics and professional responsibility courses, nor was there
a related exam as a part of the bar examination in most states. We
did have a jurisprudence course, which was more of a history
course about some of the great religious and moral leaders. As a
former history major, I loved the class, but it did not focus on pro-
fessional responsibility, except by analogy. The students were ex-
pected to make the intellectual leap and apply the teachings to
their own lives. Nonetheless, once we graduated, I honestly be-
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lieve we would never have dared to do some of the things I now
see in the courtroom, and not infrequently.
Each judge has a scrapbook of horror stories. Among my exam-
ples, one attorney became more suspect than the clients he repre-
sented, some of whom it turned out did not even know the attorney
had filed a case on their behalf. Moreover, the attorney was con-
sistently late with required filings and failed to communicate with
his clients with respect to the pleadings filed and the status of the
cases. Another attorney directly contacted the court reporting ser-
vice and attempted to have the transcript altered by instructing the
reporter to change a negative statement to a positive one after she
received a copy of the daily transcript. The reporting service con-
tacted the court. Shortly thereafter, when we held a status confer-
ence, everyone in the room but the offending attorney
remembered the witness as having made a negative statement on
the stand. Her attempted fix required a great deal of audacity and
certainly lacked professional responsibility. The court has some op-
tions to try to ensure propriety, including putting the attorney and/
or the client under oath through affidavit or live testimony. And
there is also the possibility of imposing sanctions. Judges, of
course, are reluctant to impose sanctions, but they should not be
afraid to do so.
Unfortunately, also, too many attorneys come to court unpre-
pared without having reviewed the file or the relevant case prece-
dent. In my days as a litigator, I would have been too scared to do
that. Inadequate preparation happens more often for status con-
ferences or pretrial discovery motions than at trial; regardless, it is
unacceptable. Similarly, the quality of some of the briefs filed with
the court is embarrassing, with little evidence of intelligence or ef-
fort. The majority of attorneys do an adequate, and many do an
excellent job for their client. But those who do not give a bad
name to the practice of law and the system which responsible attor-
neys try to maintain.
In sum, it is critical for the courts to ensure that litigation contin-
ues to be a search for the truth and a promotion of the highest
ethical and moral values. One of the most basic tools on which we
rely is to put witnesses under oath. Every witness is asked to take
an oath that they will "tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth." Sitting here tonight, none of us question the defini-
tion of perjury. We all readily understand the concept. We also all
agree that perjury is wrong, and agree on the critical importance of
the oath each witness takes at the start of testimony. No one has
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the privilege to lie. The expectation, at a minimum; should be that
in a courtroom - in fact, in all our relations with people - we
should be entitled to expect honesty. Anything less should cause
shock and chagrin. Although the role of the judge is often to de-
cide between two asserted truths offered by two opposing wit-
nesses, the expectation and the standard should be that both
witnesses are trying to testify in accordance with the oaths they
have taken, but have differences of opinion or different recollec-
tions of the events.
I am not so naive as to assume that everyone who comes to court
will tell the truth. However, I do not want to become as cynical
about our system as many lawyers and many members of the public
seem to have become. One attorney friend, who represents many
criminal defendants, recently told me "all my witnesses try to lie,
even to me, to help themselves." I never want to believe that every
witness potentially is violating the oath to tell the truth in his or her
own self-interest. Fortunately, on the whole, judges and juries are
surprisingly good at recognizing the lies and understanding the
truth. Let me give you one example from my private practice days.
I was part of a litigation team on a major construction accident
case. We prepared the night before trial. On the stand, one of our
principal witnesses, a senior corporate officer in the construction
company, did a complete reverisal of the testimony he had de-
scribed the night before. When we asked him why, he responded,
"I was watching the jury and I thought it would help my case." We
lost. The jury saw through it. Juries are generally comprised of
good, honest and perceptive people.
The oath to tell the truth, and, if necessary, the threat of perjury,
have been and should be promoted as the watchdogs of truthful-
ness in the courtroom. We cannot allow the expectation of truth-
fulness during discovery and trial to diminish. New York Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan coined a useful phrase, "defining devi-
ancy down,"8 9 which describes a process by which society tolerates
and comes to accept formerly unacceptable conduct. Conduct that
was previously considered negative, immoral or even criminal is
now considered normal, thus reducing the level of expectation for
appropriate, ethical and moral behavior. Gradually we make fewer
and fewer demands on members of the community. In other
words, we begin on a path of normalizing deviancy.
89. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Defining Deviancy Down, 62 AM. SCHOLAR 17
(1993).
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As attorneys, we must refuse to allow erosion of our system by
ignoring the ramifications of perjury. Every bad image of the legal
profession and system becomes true if we allow perjury to go un-
punished and to become an acceptable norm dependant upon the
circumstances. The prohibition against perjury is not negotiable.
The expectation must remain that once a witness takes an oath of
truthfulness during any part of a judicial proceeding, that witness
must meet the obligations of that oath. The procedures we use in
the courtroom must have meaning, and violation of those proce-
dures must have consequences. To excuse perjury under any cir-
cumstances is to promote the image of attorneys as slick, greasy
operatives who have been taught to manipulate the truth and who
can talk others into, or out of, anything. It is also to destroy the
very core of our judicial system.
Practicing law should be fun. It should be an honor to be admit-
ted to the bar and to continue as part of a noble profession which
defines and promotes ethics and morality. You should be in this
profession not just to support yourselves and your families, but to
reward yourselves in other ways. You also should be in it for the
intellectual satisfaction the law can provide. I certainly have that
privilege. You also should be in it to make your community a bet-
ter place, whether on the job or through extra-curricular activities
in which you share your unique skills with others.
Every day, each of us must commit to further enhance a system
of laws that promotes an ultimate forum in which conflict resolu-
tion and a search for truth is the goal we uniformly applaud and
actively support. The accomplished lawyer must combine legal
proficiency and technical skill with humanity and morality. Our
commitment as lawyers and judges alike should be to accept re-
sponsibility for the proper and effective functioning of our legal
system and to defend its basic principles. We should never allow
the pressures of our profession to compromise our commitment to
a fair and ethical search for the truth.
I thank you all for allowing me to be with you tonight.
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